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Summary 
Global enterprises are accused of eroding national tax bases by way of set-
ting up aggressive tax schemes, which enabled them to dodge taxation on a 
large scale. In response to that, both the European Union and the OECD 
drafted several means to curb this harmful conduct.  
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of linking rules, which were 
adapted as one of the alleged remedies against base erosion by the EU and 
the OECD. A number of issues emerge in connection with those recom-
mended rules.  
Clearly, the legal implications of measures proposed by the OECD are de-
batable, in contrast to EU Directives that imply legal binding force. This 
thesis will thus assess compliance of those rules against domestic and Euro-
pean legal benchmarks. German national law will serve as an example of 
domestic integration of those linking rules. Moreover, it discusses whether 
measures of this kind will eventually mitigate base erosion and double non-
taxation and if so, what are their benefits/drawbacks in comparison to al-
ready existing juridical tools. 
Following an in-depth analysis of these recommendations, this thesis reveals 
that linking rules as proposed by the OECD will in all likelihood infringe 
EU law. Likewise, the new linking rule of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
bears in itself certain risk to be found to violate EU law. Furthermore, these 
rules do arguably disqualify as anti-avoidance measures, as they do not take 
account of well-established principles in this field.  
For these reasons and the various drawbacks, which are inherent in the link-
ing rules, the thesis demonstrates that already existing legal means, such as 
CFC rules and State-Aid proceedings might also be auspicious to mitigate 
base erosion and double non-taxation.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Global enterprises, such as Apple, Starbucks and Amazon are rebuked for pay-
ing almost zero taxes on their business profits by virtue of setting up innovative 
cross-border tax arrangements.1 Such conduct is particularly accessible to Mul-
ti-national enterprises (MNEs) and is not only alleged to erode national tax ba-
ses2 but also to distort competition and to place domestic companies at a disad-
vantage.3 The European Union (EU) suffers an estimated loss of some one tril-
lion Euros every year, which is also a potential threat to fair taxation.4 
As an inevitable consequence thereof and due to high political pressure, the 
Group of 20 (G20) summoned the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to unfold forceful remedies designed to protect national 
tax bases and to mitigate base erosion. On that account, the OECD called its 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project into existence. 6 “key pressure 
areas” were discovered and translated into 15 actions, whereby each of these 
actions will be subject to a comprehensive report. On EU level, the Commission 
did also release an Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax 
evasion.5 
Both the EU and the OECD identified hybrid financial instruments as one of the 
key issues in their endeavour to fight base erosion. Hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments trigger double non-taxation and reside at the very core of international 
tax planning activities. Therefore, both the OECD and the EU advocate linking 
rules to counter mismatch arrangements in order to establish international co-
herence in taxation. Nonetheless, they pursue their aims in various ways, which 
facilitates legal pluralism.6 While the EU did include a linking rule in its Parent-
Subsidiary Directive (PSD), the OECD proposed a set of two linking rules for 
domestic legal systems.  
Evidently, the issues of double non-taxation and base erosion are on the radar of 
different organisations and institutions, where some of them are not even legal-
ly empowered.  
In response to that, the question arises, what are the legal consequences (if any) 
of these recommendations on different legal benchmarks? 
                                                
1 C. Fuest, et. al., Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinational Firms: Issues 
and Options for Reform, 2013, p. 307. 
2 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 31. 
3 A. P. Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in EU Law and in the Light of BEPS: The EC 
Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and BEPS Actions 2 and 6, 2015, p. 44. 
4 European Commission, Press Release, 2012. 
5 European Commission, COM(2012) 722 final. 
6 Compare: P.Pistone, Soft Tax Law: Steering Legal Pluralism towards International Tax 
Coordination, 2010, p. 99. 
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Incidentally, one may appreciate the fact that double non-taxation is not only a 
result of tax planning, but also an intended incentive granted by certain states to 
attract foreign investments.7 
1.2 Aim 
In light of the foregoing a significant number of issues arises. Initially, it is be-
yond doubt that provisions advised by the OECD are merely regarded as soft 
law8 instruments and do therefore not entail any legal force whatsoever. Yet, at 
the very moment, in which a state relies on these proposals and introduces them 
into its domestic legal system, they acquire legal force. On the contrary, a link-
ing rule as adopted in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive will eventually obtain 
legal force to EU Member States. 
As its main issue, the thesis is thus aimed to assess linking rules against Euro-
pean and domestic legal benchmarks. In response thereto, the author wants to 
observe if those rules, albeit already introduced in secondary EU law, could still 
infringe EU law. As regards national law, this thesis will rely on German law as 
an example of domestic integration of linking rules. Aside from legal compli-
ance issues, focus will also be drawn on whether linking rules are capable to 
pursue their intended aim, which is to counter double non-taxation, compared to 
already existing legal tools. 
This thesis will reveal that there remain major discrepancies between the rules 
recommended by the EU and the OECD. The notion of reciprocal9 conformity 
is thus not exactly accurate. 
For reasons that will be seen below, linking rules as proposed by the OECD are 
very likely to jeopardize the EU fundamental freedoms, if adopted unchanged 
into domestic law. Notwithstanding, they would need to be highly sophisticated 
and applied unanimously by all states to achieve their intended purpose to miti-
gate double non-taxation. 
Moreover, it will be demonstrated that there is also a risk – albeit diminished – 
that the linking rule in the PSD may infringe primary EU law. 
As a corollary, while there are several drawbacks inherent in the linking rules, 
other legal remedies, such as controlled foreign company rules (CFC) and state 
aid measures may prove capable to mitigate base erosion via hybrid instru-
ments. 
                                                
7 M. Gilleard, In search of harmony: Finding a consensus on hybrid mismatches. International 
Tax Review, Jul2014, Vol. 25, Issue 5. 
8 S. Douma, Leal Research in International and EU Tax Law, 2014, p. 21. 
9 A. P. Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in EU Law and in the Light of BEPS: The EC 
Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and BEPS Actions 2 and 6, 2015, p. 51. 
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1.3 Method and Material 
Since the work at hand covers manifold issues of law not only in a domestic 
context but also from an international angle, different methodological ap-
proaches have to be applied.  
Thus, the following reflections will inter alia comprise an internal perspective, 
which illuminates the topic from a legal viewpoint. This part of the analysis is 
pivotal to analyse the law as it positively stands, which will become decisive in 
the inquiry of recommended legislation by the OECD, EU or domestic law pro-
visions respectively.10 Problem solving, interpretative comments and descrip-
tion of the positive law will therefore form part of the analysis, too.11 On the 
same token, it will be scrutinized if and how these new rules may fit into the 
existing framework of international and domestic legal benchmarks.  
Extending beyond, focus will be drawn to the external perspective. This is in 
particular true as the thesis on hand discusses different sources of law such as 
primary and secondary EU law, domestic law and soft law instruments. Alt-
hough the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) did not yet render a 
judgment in respect of the proposed linking rules, the consecutive analysis re-
lies essentially on doctrinal articles and comparable case law, which will be 
complemented by relevant opinions of the Advocate Generals (AG). 
1.4 Delimitation 
The issues arising around hybrid mismatches are sheer tremendous. Hybrid 
mismatches occur in a number of situations not only as a corollary of different 
treatment of financial instruments but also emerging from different treatment of 
corporate forms in cross-border situations, such as opaque and transparent en-
terprises or hybrid transfers and repos. Additionally, in dogmatic debates, dif-
ferent approaches for potential remedies exist. General Anti Avoidance Rules 
(GAARs), amendments of the Model Convention (MC), CFC rules and Thin-
Cap provisions are counted among those. These previously mentioned ap-
proaches do rather play a peripheral role in the consecutive analysis, though. 
Instead, the subsequent work will illuminate the demanding issues arising in the 
context of linking rules as means to counter hybrid financial instruments, based 
on domestic and European law. Political affairs will also be left out of consider-
ation. 
1.5 Outline 
In the author´s view, a chronological approach to the subject at issue is most 
reasonable in pursuance of the intended goal to assess linking rules against do-
mestic and international legislative benchmarks and in context of their pursued 
                                                
10 S. Douma, Leal Research in International and EU Tax Law, 2014, p. 17. 
11 S. Douma, Leal Research in International and EU Tax Law, 2014, p. 18. 
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aim. The thesis is thus based on a “cause and effect”-pattern, which establishes 
the existence of the problem and then clarifies problematic areas.12 
On that note, the author will at first place elaborate on the OECD-related rec-
ommendations to fight base erosion due to hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
Since the proposed measures require well-founded knowledge of general prin-
ciples such as source and residence taxation, this chapter will also include a 
brief introduction to those international taxation principles. In Chapter 3, the 
author will discuss the impact of linking rules in a national context. Focus will 
be drawn on the recently applied linking rules in Germanys domestic law. Sub-
sequently, Chapter 4 is devoted to EU law and in particular to the 2015 
amendments of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which does now comprise a 
linking rule. Chapter 5 will eventually focus on other possible remedies, which 
might also be capable to mitigate double non-taxation and base erosion. 
2 BEPS Action Plan 2 
In order to protect national tax bases, the BEPS Action Plan is aimed to ensure 
that profits are taxed where economic activities generating the profits are per-
formed and where value is created.13 As lately as of September 2014, the 
OECD did publish its Action 2 Deliverable on neutralising the effects of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements as another building block of the BEPS project.14 The 
main point of concern in the area of hybrid mismatch arrangements is tied to the 
issue of double non-taxation.15  
To clarify what actually embodies a hybrid instrument and how those operate, 
the consecutive elaboration will provide some paradigms of potential hybrid 
instruments. In plain terms, hybrid mismatches are largely the outcome of dif-
ferent qualifications of debt and equity in cross-border situations between at 
least two different jurisdictions.16  
The OECD Deliverable defines Hybrid mismatch arrangements as:  
“An arrangement that exploits a difference in the tax treatment of an enti-
ty or instrument under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions to pro-
duce a mismatch in tax outcomes where that mismatch has the effect of 
lowering the aggregate tax burden of the parties to the arrangement.”17 
                                                
12 M. McKerchar, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting, 2010, p. 50. 
13 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Foreword. 
14 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing. 
15 E. C. Millán, M. S.-Roch, Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deduction & Others, 2015, p. 58. 
16 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 34. 
17 Ibid., Ch. 1, 2014. 
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Debt financing generally transfers the taxing rights from the source state to the 
residence state, while equity is rather taxed in the source state.18 The spectrum 
of those instruments ranges from loan-like corporate shares to loans with fea-
tures typically associated with equity instruments.19 But what is the effect on 
tax base?  
If a company in State A finances its subsidiary in State B, which then in return 
pays remuneration to its parent company in State A, both jurisdictions involved 
have to qualify the form of finance either as debt or equity. The qualification 
depends however predominantly on domestic legislation of the States con-
cerned. A Hybrid mismatch is likely to occur as soon as State B treats the re-
muneration paid by the subsidiary as interest, while from a perspective of State 
A, the payment qualifies as equity or vice versa. As a result State B will usually 
grant a deduction for the interest paid, while State A may exempt the payment 
as remuneration of equity. Hence, no tax is levied and double non-taxation 
emerges (negative qualification conflict).20 Yet, there is a not only a risk of 
double non-taxation, but also of double taxation (positive qualification con-
flict).21 Double taxation may occur right at the moment when State B qualifies 
the remuneration payment as equity and taxes it accordingly, whereas State A 
treats the incoming remuneration as interest income and levies income tax ac-
cordingly.22 
Treatment of perpetual debt may serve as an appropriate example of a hybrid 
financial instrument. Whereas perpetual debt is treated as debt in some jurisdic-
tions, it will most likely be re-characterized as equity-like attributions of the 
perpetual investment in the US. The income of the perpetual debt will therefore 
qualify as dividend and hence entitle the owner to an indirect foreign tax cred-
it.23 Taxpayers are generally said to be very thriving in using perpetual debt to 
achieve inconsistent cross-border treatment.24 In any case this is only one out of 
countless manifestations25 of hybrid mismatch arrangements. Noteworthy, dou-
ble non-taxation is also likely to occur as a result of an intended tax incentive 
granted by one of the states concerned.  
                                                
18 S. E. Bärsch, Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived 
Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context, 2012, p. 41. 
19 E. Eberhartinger, Taxation of Cross-Border Hybrid Finance, 2009, p. 4. 
20 E. Eberhartinger, M. Six, Taxation of Cross-Border Hybr. Fin.: A Legal Analysis, 2009, p. 4. 
21 See also: K. D. Weber, Tax Treaty Treatment of Dividend Related Payments under Share 
Loan Agreements, 2014, p. 112. 
22 Ibid, p. 112. 
23 A. Krahmal, International Hybrid Instr./Jurisdiction Depend. Characterization, 2005, Ch. III. 
24 ibid, Ch. III. 
25 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 30 f. 
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In order to curb those arrangements, the report calls for both adjustments of 
domestic legislation and the MC as well. The proposed changes to domestic 
legislation shall also ensure that a payment may not be deducted twice.26 
That being said, the OECD targets two types of arrangements, namely double 
deduction and Deduction/No-Inclusion situations. The latter relates to arrange-
ments where a payment is deductible in the payer jurisdiction, but the same 
payment is not included in the payee’s jurisdiction.27 The former relates to ar-
rangements, which give rise to a double deduction of one and the same pay-
ment.28 
As outlined previously, some arrangements bring about the risk of double taxa-
tion. On that note, Action 2 calls for enhanced co-ordination and the implemen-
tation of a tiebreaker rule, when more than one country seeks to apply the rec-
ommended rules.29 
But what is precisely suggested to allay those issues of double non-taxation? 
2.1 Linking Rules 
The OECD recommendations are based on linking rules to counter the negative 
effects of mismatch arrangements. Linking rules seek to align the tax treatment 
of a hybrid instrument in one jurisdiction with the counterparty’s jurisdiction to 
achieve uniform treatment in both countries concerned.30 These provisions are 
inter alia designed to prevent the application of dividend exemption rules in 
cases of deductible payments made under a financial instrument.31 Therefore, as 
regards D/NI outcomes, linking rules apply predominantly in situations, where 
the resident state does generally not include a certain income in its taxable base, 
although this item of income was already subject to a deduction in the source 
state. 
In contrast to thin-cap rules, linking rules do not re-characterize the hybrid in-
strument from debt to equity or vice versa. They do only allocate the right to 
tax.32 
2.1.1 Primary Rule 
When it comes to arrangements that amount to Deduction/No-Inclusion out-
comes, the Report advocates a primary rule according to which the payer´s ju-
                                                
26 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 14. 
27 Ibid, p. 14. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, p. 14 subs. 
30 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 12. 
31 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 13. 
32 R. de Boer, BEPS2, Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 2015, p. 24. 
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risdiction has to deny the deduction of outbound payments, in cases where 
those payments were not included in the payee’s taxable income.33 Hence, the 
provision requires the payer´s jurisdiction to possess certain knowledge of the 
foreign tax treatment. The recommended rule under paragraph (a) of the title 
“Neutralise the mismatch to the extent payment gives rise to a D/NI Outcome”, 
reads as follows: 
“The payer jurisdiction will deny a deduction for such payment to the 
extent it gives rise to a D/NI outcome.”34 
As a critical point, the scope of this rule shall be limited to financial instruments 
held by related parties.35 The Report requires therefore a standard of 25 % di-
rect or indirect ownership to qualify as a related party.36  
Yet, in case of a “structured arrangement“, the scope will automatically be ex-
tended to non-related parties, either.37 
2.1.2 Secondary Rule 
However, if the payer´s jurisdiction does not enforce the primary rule, the risk 
of double non-taxation is still present. Consequently, the deliverable endorses a 
secondary, “defensive rule”, which allows the payment to be included as ordi-
nary income in the payee´s jurisdiction.38 This rule is particularly tailored for 
countries that apply domestic dividend exemption schemes.  
The defensive rule reads as follows: 
“If the payer jurisdiction does not neutralise the mismatch then the pay-
ee jurisdiction will require such payment to be included in ordinary in-
come to the extent the payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome.”39 
Therefore the Report recommends that those jurisdictions, which apply divi-
dend exemption schemes, shall not extent this exemption to situations where the 
dividend is already deductible in the Source State.40  
                                                
33 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 15. 
34 Ibid p. 37. 
35 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 36. 
36 R. de Boer, BEPS2, Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 2015, p. 19: 
Conflict with PSD, see ch. 4.2.1. 
37 See Ch. 4.3: OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 36. 
38 Ibid., p. 15. 
39 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 37. 
40 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 40. 
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After all, it is reasonable to argue that the primary rule by itself may only 
achieve its aim of taxation of an item of income when it is transnationally ap-
plied. Transnational application of the primary rule would safeguard taxation of 
a hybrid instrument in the source state. Yet, uniform application may require a 
number of years.41 A situation where the primary rule is not applied by the 
source state will in all likelihood lead to double non-taxation. Therefore, If the 
primary rule is not applied, the secondary rule, as a defensive rule, makes sure 
that the hybrid instrument will at least be taxed once, in the resident state. 
As a result, while the primary rule is not in all circumstances sufficient to 
achieve taxation of a hybrid instrument, the secondary rule works as a backup 
provision and ensures taxation thereof. Hence, application of both the primary 
and secondary rule ensures taxation of hybrid instruments following the subject 
to tax principle and mitigates double non-taxation.42  
However, the secondary rule allocates the taxing right to the resident state, 
which may yet be in conflict with general principles of source and resident 
taxation in some circumstances43, given the fact that this item of income will 
usually have no economic link whatsoever to the resident state.  
In return to what was already mentioned earlier, prosperity of these recommen-
dations depends on a large scale on comprehensive ratification, which might be 
questionable from today´s perspective.44 
Another problem particularly in respect of linking rules is that they require 
states to acknowledge the foreign law and also to be familiar with the tax treat-
ment of an item of income in the counterparty’s jurisdiction. While in first place 
that is not only an administrative burden, it may also become an unsolvable 
issue in a scenario where the resident country itself is uncertain about the accu-
rate treatment within its jurisdiction.45  
Yet, it remains sketchy, if for instance a 95 % participation exemption granted 
in the payee´s state will be deemed as not included and hence trigger applica-
tion of the primary rule in the source state. And vice versa, if 5 % taxation in 
the source state may be considered as included in the foreign tax base?46 Fur-
ther guidance is urgently required.  
                                                
41 R. de Boer, BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 
2015, p. 20: M. Gilleard, In search of harmony: Finding a consensus on hybrid mismatches, 
2014. 
42 See ch.: 2.2.1. 
43 See ch. 2.2 below: J. Lüdicke, “Tax Arbitrage” with Hybrid Entities: Challenges and 
Responses, 2014, p. 316. 
44 M. Gilleard, In search of harmony: Finding a consensus on hybrid mismatches. in: 
International Tax Review, 2014, Vol. 25, Issue 5. 
45 M. Gilleard, In search of harmony: Finding a consensus on hybrid mismatches. in: 
International Tax Review, 2014, Vol. 25, Issue 5. 
46 T. J. Wielenga, TEI Comments on BEPS Action 2: Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 2014. 
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2.2 Underlying Principles of Source and Resident Taxation 
Since linking rules are designed to allocate the taxing rights among jurisdic-
tions, it is at first place decisive to create a common understanding of the basic 
principles of source and resident taxation.  
From an international perspective, it is generally accepted, that countries tax 
their residents based on their worldwide income, while non-residents are only 
taxed on income arising within their borders.47 Source based taxation follows 
the principal of territoriality48, which implies for instance, that a state should 
not have tax competence over non-resident subsidiaries.49 
Due to the fact that this system will likely lead to a situation where an item of 
income being subject to tax in both the resident and the source state, jurisdic-
tions negotiate tax treaties to provide relief of double taxation. It is therefore 
well established that the source countries’ taxing rights prevail over the income 
that arises within its borders. Consequently, it is for the resident state to provide 
relief from double taxation.50  
Relief is either achieved by the exemption method, or by adopting a tax-credit 
for the taxes paid in the source state. These principles may yet be limited by 
certain applicable General-Anti Avoidance Rules (GAARs), for instance CFC 
or Thin-Cap rules. 
Another generally accepted principle is that active business income should be 
taxed at source, while passive income will be taxed on a residence basis.51  
However, if the resident country applies a participation exemption scheme and 
a certain income is not taxed in the source state, this will lead to double non-
taxation. A switchover to a foreign tax-credit may yet provide decent remedy 
thereof. 52 
Deduced therefrom, states enforce their jurisdiction from the nationality and the 
territoriality principle.  
It appears, as regards passive income, that the primary linking rule breaks the 
principle according to which it is for the resident state to tax that income, be-
cause it transfers the right to tax to the source state. The same is true for the 
defensive rule in a situation where active income is not taxed in the source 
state, but following the secondary rule, included into the taxable income of the 
resident state. Hence, linking rules bear the risk to run contrary to the “no taxa-
                                                
47 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 3. 
48 O. Marres, The Principle of Territoriality and Cross-Border Loss Compensation, 2011, p. 
113: C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, par. 39. 
49 O. Marres, The Principle of Territoriality & Cross-Border Loss Compensation, 2011, p. 114. 
50 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 4. 
51 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 4. 
52 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 43. 
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tion without representation”-principle. The German constitutional Court did 
already challenge the bond-buying program of the European Central Bank 
based on this principle.53  
However, according to a literal interpretation method, both the primary and the 
secondary rule apply only “to the extent it gives rise to a D/NI outcome”, which 
might therefore be viewed as lex specialis, as well, since they only apply in 
deduction and non-inclusion situations. 
2.2.1 Single Tax Principle and Neutrality 
Linking rules do therefore ascertain that a hybrid instrument will be subject to 
tax at least once, thus taking into account the single tax principle54, which en-
sures avoidance of double non-taxation. Hence, the primary and the secondary 
rule may from a technical perspective ensure single taxation of a hybrid instru-
ment, although they entail a number of shortcomings.  
Some concerns are related to the concepts of Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) 
and Capital Export Neutrality (CEN). In this respect, the secondary rule, which 
allows to refrain from the exemption method and to tax certain income instead, 
may be contrary to the envisaged CIN, since inbound investments would be 
rendered unattractive. The same is true for the primary rule being contradictory 
to CEN, as outbound investments are less attractive. 
Since mismatches occur predominantly in the context of passive income, the 
primary rule facilitates access to an item of income to which a jurisdiction has 
no link whatsoever and is thus contrary to the principles of source and resident 
taxation. 
In the authors view, the alleged linking rules pursue the aim to tax an item of 
income at least once, but they may also be found to be contrary to these general 
allocation principles. AG Kokott argues, that the single tax-principle is also 
inherent in the justification based on the coherence of the tax system, which 
will be discussed further below.55 
3 Linking Rule in Germany 
Raffaelle Russo, director of the BEPS project, said that some countries move 
ahead with implementing measures, is “evidence of the fact that there is politi-
cal pressure to fix problems and to do it quickly.”56 
                                                
53 P. de Grauwe, Why the European Court of Justice should reject the German Constitutional 
Court’s ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions, 2014.  
54 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 5. 
55 C-319/02 Manninen [2004], AG Kokott Opinion, par. 51. 
56 A. Athanasiou, Jumping the Gate on BEPS Unilateral Actions, 2015, p. 937. 
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On that note, Germany anticipated the measures of the OECD and did already 
implement a linking rule in its domestic corporate income tax scheme (CIT) by 
way of extending the scope of its matching principle (“Materielles 
Korrspondenzprinzip”).57 
On general terms, German incorporated taxpayers are subject to both corporate 
income and trade tax.58 Interest payments are fully deductible at a corporation 
level, while dividend payments are not tax deductible at a corporation level.59 
However, the German CIT grants a participation exemption scheme to corpo-
rate dividend recipients, holding at least 10 % of share capital in the distributing 
company. 
As a result, dividends are generally exempt at the shareholder level in order to 
avoid economic double taxation, despite of 5 %, which is considered a non-tax-
deductible business expense.  
However, tax authorities may now refuse to grant the participation exemption 
based on the new linking rule. The new provision reads as follows: 
“The participation exemption scheme does only apply to the extent, that 
the earnings did not reduce the income of the distributing entity.”60 
This rule limits the scope of the participation exemption (“Schachtelprivileg”) 
for dividends in case of hybrid financial instruments.61 Thus, any income re-
ceived by a German company, which would typically fall under the participa-
tion exemption scheme, will no longer be exempt if the payment was already 
deductible at the level of the distributing company.62 As a corollary, such pay-
ment, which led to a deduction at the level of the payer, will be subject to Ger-
man corporate taxation and solidarity surcharge, too.63  
3.1 Compliance with Domestic Law 
Procedural issues arise in relation to the new provision. In order to determine if 
the payment led to an income reduction of the foreign company, the foreign tax 
legislation is decisive64, which may cause an additional administrative burden 
on both the German and the foreign-based company. On the same token it is not 
clear, who will be liable to furnish the relevant evidence. According to § 88 of 
                                                
57 C. Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An Analysis of Cross-Border Financing 
from a German Perspective , 2015, p. 225. 
58 S.-E. Bärsch: Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: OECD Recommendations and German 
Practice, 2013, p. 525. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Free translation of § 8b I 2 KStG. 
61 A. Schnitger, M. Weiss, Empfehlungen der OECD zu „Hybrid Mismatches“ für die nationale 
– Steuergesetzgebung, 2014, Ch. 3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 O. Wehnert, German Tax Planning: Anti Hybrid Financing Measures, 2015. 
64 L. Richter, D. Reeb, Z. Ausdehnung d. materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs. 1 S. 2 
KStG durch d. AmtshilfeRLUmsG i. Spannungsfeld von Europa- und VölkerR, 2015, S. 42. 
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the General Fiscal Law, it is for the tax authorities to determine the relevant 
facts. Yet, as regards cross-border situations, § 90 par. 2 AO states, that the tax-
payer has a duty to collaborate and also bears the burden of proof for tax con-
cessions.  
Irrespective of any EU law implications, this outcome is contrary to the pursued 
aim by the German legislator to “facilitate and modernize the CIT”65. In addi-
tion it remains highly questionable if a taxpayer can even furnish evidence of a 
non-performed income-reduction at the level of the distributing company.66 
This may likely prove to be impossible in certain situations, since there is gen-
erally no data available on “non”-performed deductions. 
Furthermore, the regulation will have as a consequence that Germany will tax 
income, which in itself does not belong to its tax base. Moreover, incentives 
granted by other states to attract foreign investments are revoked by the German 
legislation, which is also contrary to the concept of CIN.67 However, this as-
sumption does only hold true unless the source state applies the primary rule 
following the OECD proposals. In this scenario, the primary rule would allow 
the source state to tax the instrument and CIN would ultimately be maintained.  
Yet, a scenario, in which both rules were applied simultaneously by each of the 
jurisdictions, entails also a risk of double taxation. To prevent this outcome, the 
OECD seeks to design a tiebreaker rule in future deliverables.68 
It is also disputable, whether this rule will bring any benefit compared to al-
ready existing provisions. Firstly, there are already comparable provisions in 
the German Tax Code, which would allow the tax authorities to refuse exemp-
tion of certain income, even if provided by a tax treaty.69 Secondly, the supreme 
fiscal Court accepted denial of exemption for certain hybrid payments, too.70 
Some authors argue that the GAARs of §§ 41, 42 of the fiscal code will be ca-
pable to achieve the same result.71 The author is however of the opinion, that 
GAARs are not efficient to counter hybrid mismatches, which will be discussed 
further below.72 
According to the German Bundesrat, the main purpose of this legislation is to 
counter arrangements, which are liable to generate “white earnings” (e.g. dou-
                                                
65 Bundesrat, Drucksache 54/11, 2011. 
66 Becker, Loose: Zur geplanten Ausdehnung des materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips auf 
hybride Finanzierungen, 2012, p. 760. 
67 Becker, Loose: Zur geplanten Ausdehnung des materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips auf 
hybride Finanzierungen, 2012, p. 761. 
68 OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 25. 
69 § 50d par. 9 KStG. 
70 BFH v. 4. 6. 2008, I R 62/06, BStBl II 2008, 793, IStR 2008, 739. 
71 Becker, Loose: Zur geplanten Ausdehnung des materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips auf 
hybride Finanzierungen, 2012, p. 762. 
72 See ch. 4.3 below. 
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ble non-taxation) due to negative cross-border conflicts of qualification stand-
ards.73 However, that purpose finds only poor reflection in the wording of the 
legislation.74 In fact, the rule applies not only to hybrid instruments, but to all 
sorts of profit distributions.75 
Additionally, the scope of the provision is limited to earnings that must have 
reduced the income of the paying company. Hence, it does not cover earnings, 
which were not subject to tax on the level of the paying company and did there-
fore not reduce the income of the latter.76 The legislation is to that extent not 
fully effective to cover all kinds of hybrid mismatches and double non-taxation 
is not entirely abolished.  
It follows, the wording of the German linking rule is broader than its intended 
aim and it does also not mitigate double non-taxation in every situation. 
Incidentally, hybrid mismatches, which generate double taxation, do not fall in 
the scope of the law, which is a cause for criticism among German jurispru-
dence.77 
3.2 Compliance with the OECD Recommendations 
The German rule applies in particular to inbound dividends, and enables the 
resident state (Germany) to tax incoming payments to the extent that those have 
not been subject to tax in the source state. Upon first sight, this provision seems 
to be tantamount to the secondary rule of the OECD recommendations78, since 
both align the treatment of an item of income in the resident state with the re-
spective treatment in the source state.  
However, following a literal interpretation of the German legislation, it covers 
not only hybrid instruments but also other profit distributions, such as ordinary 
dividends unless those were subject to tax in the source state.  
As regards their scope, the German legislation of § 8 b I KStG requires a 10 % 
shareholding to apply, as opposed to the 25 % threshold proclaimed by the 
                                                
73 L. Richter, D. Reeb, Zur Ausdehnung d. materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs. 1 S. 
2 KStG durch d. AmtshilfeRLUmsG i. Spannungsfeld von Europa- und VölkerR, 2015, p. 41. 
74 Ibid, p. 53.: Bundesrat, Drucksache 205/14, 2014. 
75 C. Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An Analysis of Cross-Border Financing 
from a German Perspective , 2015, p. 225. 
76 L. Richter, D. Reeb, Zur Ausdehnung d. materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs. 1 S. 
2 KStG durch d. AmtshilfeRLUmsG i. Spannungsfeld von Europa- und VölkerR, 2015, p. 42. 
77 Ibid. 
78 C. Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An Analysis of Cross-Border Financing 
from a German Perspective , 2015, p. 218; W. Staats, Zur Neutralisierung Hybrider 
Gestaltungen - Der OECD-Bericht zu Maßnahme 2 des BEPS-Aktionsplans, 2014, Ch. 3. 
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OECD recommendations. As a result, the scope of the German legislation is 
clearly broader than proposed by the OECD.79  
Notwithstanding, since those rules deny a deduction in the source state, which 
would otherwise be granted, concerns may arise in relation to the non-
discrimination article of the OECD Model Convention. 
While the German linking rule does not require a cross-border payment in order 
to apply, it does actually only apply in cross-border situations, since a qualifica-
tion conflict may in all likelihood not be found to exist in a plain domestic sce-
nario.80 Therefore, one may envisage a covert discrimination in the sense of 
Article 24 MC. However, as stated in the Commentary, Article 24 may only 
apply in cases of overt discriminations.81 
In contrast to that, the supreme German Fiscal Court (BFH) rendered that also 
covert discriminations shall be in the scope of Article 24 MC. It remains to be 
seen if the German Fiscal Court will maintain its jurisprudence against the 
backdrop of the BEPS recommendations.82 
The OECD is however also working on several treaty amendments, which may 
resolve the issue in the near future. 
It follows, albeit both the national German linking rule and the defensive rule 
pursue identical aims, there remain differences as regards their design and 
scope. 
3.2.1 Treaty Override 
Incidentally, the German legislation may in some instances result in a treaty-
override. 
According to settled case law of the supreme fiscal court, both German domes-
tic legislation and Treaty law are of equal value.83 In a conflict between a treaty 
rule and a domestic rule, preference must be given to the less restrictive rule. In 
respect of passive income, Article 10 of the MC is less restrictive, since its ap-
plication is only tied to the condition of a 10 % shareholding in a related com-
pany. This may very likely lead to an outcome, where Germany is forced to 
exempt a hybrid instrument, contrary to the national linking rule, but as a corol-
lary of the applicable Tax treaty.84 However, this outcome has been anticipated 
                                                
79 C. Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An Analysis of Cross-Border Financing 
from a German Perspective, p. 225, 2015: M. Desens, Kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu den 
geplanten Änderungen in § 8b KStG, 2014, Ch. 2.1. 
80 A. Schnitger, M. Oskamp, Empfehlungen der OECD zur Neutralisierung von "Hybrid 
Mismatches" auf Abkommensebene, 2014, Ch. 3.5. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Compare: BFH v. 14.1.2009 - IR47/08, BStBl II 2011, 131, IStR 2009, 424 Rz. 15. 
84 L. Richter, D. Reeb, Zur Ausdehnung d. materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs. 1 S. 
2 KStG durch d. AmtshilfeRLUmsG im Spannungsfeld v. Europa- und VölkerR, 2015, p. 53. 
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by the German legislator, who did therefore implement another sub-clause in § 
8 b I KStG. § 8 b I clause 3, states that the denial of a participation exemption 
according to the domestic linking rule does still apply even if a treaty would 
provide for the contrary.85 Evidently, this regulation amounts to a treaty-
override. The German Federal Tax Court did already hold a treaty-override to 
be unconstitutional.86 This matter is now referred to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. If this case leads to invalidity of the treaty-override, the linking rule 
would remain without any effect. 
It may however be said that in particular newly negotiated tax treaties do in-
clude subject-to-tax clauses, which are akin to the German domestic linking 
rules.87 According to Lang, changes to tax treaties bear however the risk of a 
reverse interpretation, according to which precisely those new principles were 
not binding in other treaties.88 
3.3 Compliance with EU Law 
Significant focus has to be drawn to the new rule in respect of possible impacts 
that EU law might have on it. Especially the non-discrimination concept, inher-
ent in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), has been 
used by the ECJ to strike down several tax provisions of its Member States.89 
One may bear in mind that direct taxation within the EU is in principal a matter 
of each Member State´s juridical sovereignty, as opposed to indirect taxation, 
which is harmonized and in so far exclusively subject to supranational legisla-
tion. However, one would be mistaken to assume that Member States of the EU 
are entirely free to enact direct tax legislation ad libitum and would therefore 
not be subject to the constraints of primary and secondary EU law.90 On the 
contrary, all national legislation must comply with primary EU law, namely the 
TFEU, and above all the Fundamental Freedoms thereof.91 The Treaty is aimed 
to create a Common Market with an economic monetary union and a common 
currency.92 Any unjustified restriction or discrimination imposed by national 
legislation bears the risk to infringe primary EU law and might be declared void 
by the ECJ. 
                                                
85 § 8 b I S. 3 KStG. 
86 BFH I R 4/13: A. Cloer, T. Hagemann, F. Tax Court Holds Treaty Override Unconstitutional, 
2014, p. 510. 
87 L. Richter, D. Reeb, supra. 84, p. 53. 
88 M. Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties, 2014, p. 656; See 
also Ch. 4.3. 
89 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law, 2015, p. 66. 
90 E. Traversa, Interest Deductibility and the BEPS Action Plan: nihil novi sub sole? 2013, p. 7. 
91 J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1, 2013, p. 539. 
92 C. Brokelind and others, Business Taxation Within and Across the Borders of the European 
Union, 2003, p. 38. 
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Due to the fact, that the domestic German legislation is akin to the defensive 
rule suggested by the OECD, the following elaboration will focus on whether 
that rule complies with EU law.  
According to settled case law of the ECJ, the Court will as a first step investi-
gate which of the fundamental freedoms may fall in the scope of the relevant 
provision. Subsequently, the Court will determine if the provision at hand caus-
es a restriction to the relevant freedom. Finally, if there are no grounds of justi-
fication, the measure at issue will likely be found to violate EU law.  
3.3.1 Determination of the Applicable Freedom 
In the first place, it needs to be established, which of the freedoms will eventu-
ally apply to the German linking rule.  
Linking rules will most likely be assessed in light of the freedom of establish-
ment93 and the free movement of capital94. According to well-established case 
law of the ECJ, application of the freedom of establishment depends as a gen-
eral rule on the existence of a certain shareholding in another company in a 
cross-border situation. Therefore the ECJ applies the freedom of establishment 
in cases, where a definite influence in another company is to be found. In FII 
Group-Litigation, the ECJ held, that a 10 % shareholding might not be suffi-
cient to qualify as a definite influence.95 However, also minority shareholdings 
may in some instances lead to a definite influence.96 Where no definite influ-
ence is to be found, the free movement of capital will arguably be applied.97 
The latter also covers arrangements tied to third countries.  
Since the German linking rule requires a shareholding of at least 10 %, it will 
most likely depend on a case-by-case study if the Court applies the freedom of 
establishment or the free movement of capital. 
3.3.2 Restriction of the Relevant Freedom 
In order to cause a restriction to the relevant freedom, the national legislation 
must cause an unjustified discrimination to the applicable freedom. 
                                                
93 Article 56 TFEU; J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1, 
2013, p. 540. 
94 Article 63 TFEU; L. Richter, D. Reeb, Zur Ausdehnung des materiellen 
Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs. 1 S. 2 KStG durch 49 das AmtshilfeRLUmsG im 
Spannungsfeld von Europa-und Völkerrecht, 2015, p. 49. 
95 C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[2006], par. 36 f.  
96 C-326/07 Commission vs. Italy [2009], par. 38: also Kokott, AG opinion in C-311/08 Société 
de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) v État belge [2010], par. 35. 
97 M. Helminen, EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation, 2013, p. 123 ff; M. Desens, Kritische 
Bestandsaufnahme zu den geplanten Änderungen in § 8b KStG, 2014, Ch. 2.2.1. 
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A restriction is present, when different rules are applied to comparable situa-
tions or the same rules are applied to different situations.98 In order to find a 
comparable situation, the Court relies either on a vertical or on a horizontal ap-
proach.99 While the vertical approach compares a domestic and a cross-border 
situation, the horizontal approach compares two cross-border situations.100 
Approval of a restriction depends also on if the Court compares the Group as a 
whole or on a standalone basis, which is tantamount to either, a per-country or 
an overall approach.101 As regards the situation of resident countries, the Court 
appears to give precedence to the overall approach, which means that the Court 
takes the situation in another country into consideration in order to determine if 
a certain provision infringes EU law.102 
As the German rule does not explicitly distinguish between domestic and cross-
border situations, it may only constitute a covert discrimination103 based on 
nationality. Yet, according to the ECJ, even covert discriminations may infringe 
EU law, unless justified.104 
A rule that denies a domestic participation exemption in certain cross-border 
situations, which instead includes the income in the national tax base, is equiva-
lent to the German rule and may by virtue of this implication constitute a re-
striction to the freedom of establishment, since cross-border situations are treat-
ed less favourably compared to pure domestic set-ups.105 Likewise, Prof. De-
sens argues, the German legislation is very likely to cause a discrimination to 
EU law.106 
On the other hand, the Court did not find a restriction in the Columbus Contain-
er verdict, where a domestic rule provided for a switch over from an exemption 
method to a tax credit if an entity was subject to low taxation abroad.107 This 
was also confirmed by the Court´s Grand Chamber in the Kerckhaert-Morres 
case.108 Additionally, the Court accepted juridical double taxation as a result of 
the exercise of each Member States fiscal sovereignty, “which may only be 
                                                
98 C- 279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker [1995], par. 30. 
99 J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1 2013, p. 550. 
100 Ibid. 
101 J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1 2013, p. 550. 
102 M. Lang, ECJ case law on cross-border dividend tax. ± recent developments, 2008, p. 72. 
103 Ibid. 
104 M. Helminen, EU Tax Law, 2013, Ch. 2.1.2. 
105 J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1, 2013, p. 550; P. 
Wittenstein, Momentaufnahme zur Steuergestaltung mit hybriden Finanzinstrumenten:  
"Luxembourg Leaks" und neue Gesetze(-svorhaben) in Europa, 2015, Ch 4.3.3. 
106 M. Desens, Kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu den geplanten Änderungen in § 8b KStG, 2014, 
Ch. 2 & 2.2.1. 
107 C-298/05 Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt 
[2007], par. 38. 
108 C-513/04, Kerckhaert-Morres v Belgische Staat [2006], par. 17. 
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solved by harmonizing the tax systems” between Member States.109 It also clar-
ified that the situation of resident dividend recipients and non-resident dividend 
recipients is not necessarily comparable.110 The Court rendered in its Schempp 
decision that rules, which address inconsistencies among different tax systems, 
do not infringe the fundamental freedoms, because of a lack of comparabil-
ity.111 In this case, the ECJ allowed Germany to apply a deduction for mainte-
nance payments based on the condition that those are taxed in another Member 
State. According to the Court, this treatment causes a disparity rather than dis-
crimination.112 Thus, autonomous qualification of hybrid instruments is a mere 
consequence of the simultaneous application of domestic rules.113 While that 
case law serves as an argument, that the German linking rule might conceivably 
not cause a restriction, other case law provides for the contrary assumption. On 
that note, the Court held in Eurowings, that any advantage which is granted in a 
low tax country, cannot itself authorize another Member State to neutralize that 
advantage by imposing an additional tax in that state.114 
It follows, that there is clearly a clash of different assumptions. While most of 
the scholars argue that this provision may likely cause a restriction, the previous 
case law is rather inconsistent. In the author´s view, finding of a restriction de-
pends eventually on a case-by-case assessment. It is therefore necessary to ana-
lyse if a possible restriction may be justified, though.  
3.3.3 Justification of the Relevant Freedom 
Unless the provision is not justified due to overriding reasons of public inter-
est115, the German legislation may likely be found to jeopardize the EU funda-
mental freedoms. Possible justification grounds may be seen in the need to pre-
vent tax avoidance and the necessity to maintain the coherence of the tax sys-
tem.  
This chapter will only briefly cover the relevant justifications. A more in-depth 
analysis follows in context of the primary rule below.116 
A justification based on the need to prevent tax avoidance may yet be ill found-
ed, because the German legislation does not precisely refer to artificial ar-
                                                
109 C-513/04, Kerckhaert-Morres v Belgische Staat [2006], par. 22. 
110 C-170/05 Denkavit Internationaal BV v Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie [2006], par. 34. 
111 C-403/03 Egon Schempp v Finanzamt München V [2005], par. 34: C. Marchgraber, 
Tackling Deduction and Non-Inclusion Schemes – The Proposal of the European 
Commission, 2014, p. 139. 
112 D. Weber, Tax coordination: a joint responsibility of the Member States. Still a fantasy? 
2007, p. 162. 
113 J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1, 2013, p. 541. 
114 C-294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehr AG v Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna [1999], par. 44. 
115 C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue [2007], par. 64. 
116 See ch. 4.1.2. 
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rangements, which is required by the ECJ in several judgments.117 There is no 
particular reference to wholly artificial arrangement in the German law.118  
Noteworthy, the Court also held, that a loss in tax revenue cannot be regarded 
as an overriding reason in public interest to justify a restrictive provision.119 
A further possible justification may be seen in the necessity to maintain the 
coherence of the tax system, since the German Rule prevents application of a 
certain tax benefit (participation exemption) only to the extent that the related 
payment was already subject to tax beyond its borders. There is also a direct 
link between the denial of the tax benefit and the incomes resulting thereof.120  
However, this rule allows Germany access to income, to which it has no eco-
nomic connection and is thus in conflict with the principle of no taxation with-
out representation. On the other hand, the Court seems recently reluctant to ac-
cept justifications based on territoriality.121 
Incidentally, even if the German legislation would be justified based on the co-
herence of the tax system, it must nevertheless be proportionate to achieve its 
intended aim, too. A national rule must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve its intended aim. 
Albeit the legislation is aimed to counter “white earnings”, it is only capable to 
oppose double non-taxation of income, which has actually been identified for 
tax purposes in the other state. Unidentified income may still lead to double 
non-taxation. Consequently, the provision is not in every respect adequate to 
pursue its aim. Secondly, it may considered to be not appropriate, as its scope is 
not only limited to hybrid instruments but to any type of income. Moreover, 
excessive compliance burdens may also render the legislation inappropriate. 
As a consequence, the ECJ would arguably reject such legislation based on a 
lack of appropriateness.122 
Prima facie, the German linking rule runs the risk to be contradictory to the EU 
fundamental freedoms.123 It remains yet to be seen if the legislator will amend 
the legislation in order to comply with the new linking rule, which has been 
implemented in the PSD.124  
                                                
117 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006], par. 51: 
C‑318/10, Société d’investissement pour l’agriculture tropicale (SIAT) v État belge, par. 40. 
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4 Linking Rules at the Benchmark of EU Law 
While the analysis before did already address possible impacts of EU Law on 
the defensive rule, two further issues have to be taken into consideration. In the 
first place, it is also decisive to examine if the proposed primary linking rule 
complies with EU law. To recall, once a EU Member State implements a do-
mestic law based on the OECD recommendations, it will unfold legal effect and 
is bound to comply with supranational law.  
The second issue, which will be dealt with hereafter, is devoted to the enacted 
linking rule in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. In contrast to the OECD rec-
ommendations, a Directive is legally binding to the Member States as to the 
result to be achieved.125 
4.1 Compliance of the Primary Rule with EU Law 
The primary rule as recommended by the OECD, requires the payer-jurisdiction 
to tax an instrument, which is under normal circumstances exempt, dependent 
on the condition that the payee´s jurisdiction does not include the respective 
income in its tax base. This legislation is therefore predominantly related to 
outbound situations. Incidentally, the primary rule will be assessed based on the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. 
4.1.1 Restriction of the Relevant Freedom 
Again, to be compatible with primary EU law, the legislation at issue must not 
cause a restriction to the fundamental freedoms.  
Under the vertical approach, the primary rule may very likely cause discrimina-
tion, since only cross-border set-ups run the risk to be taxed whereas in a pure 
domestic situation, exemption schemes apply. In the SGI case, the Court ap-
plied a vertical approach and stated that a provision may be liable to cause a 
restriction to the fundamental freedoms if it treats a domestic situation differ-
ently than a cross-border arrangement.126  
On the other hand, the horizontal approach may only lead to a restriction de-
pending on the chosen comparison by the Court. For instance, if the Court 
compares the relevant situation with a situation in another jurisdiction where 
the same treatment applies, no discrimination will be found and vice versa.  
In any event, comparability does always hinge on a case-by-case assessment, 
depending on the specific legal background of the relevant case, which is also 
confirmed by M. Lang.127 
                                                
125 Article 288 TFEU. 
126 C-311/08 Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) v État belge [2010], par. 50. 
127 M. Lang, ECJ case law on cross-border dividend tax. ± recent developments, 2008, p. 74. 
   21 
 
It turns out, although by admitting that it is rather difficult to draw a final con-
clusion, the primary rule entails at least certain risk to cause a restriction, since 
it treats outbound payments different than pure domestic set-ups. This does also 
depend on whether the Court would eventually assess the comparability based 
on a vertical or horizontal approach. Advocate General (AG) Kokott also sus-
pects that a rule, which would only apply depending on certain tax treatment in 
another country, will arguably result in a restriction of the fundamental free-
doms.128 
4.1.2 Justification of the Restriction 
As a next step, it must be examined if there are any possible justification 
grounds, which would be accepted by the ECJ.  
4.1.2.1 Coherence of the Tax System 
A possible justification may be seen in the need to ensure the coherence of the 
national tax system, which was already accepted by the ECJ in the Bachman-
Case.129 Cohesion of the tax system is “the grant of a tax advantage and the 
offsetting of that advantage by a fiscal levy.”130 According to the Court, the 
need to preserve the cohesion of the tax system has to be examined on the basis 
of objectives pursued by the relevant tax system.131 Additionally, it requires a 
direct link between a tax advantage and the compensation of this advantage.132 
It appears, though, that the Court does not accept a direct link in a situation 
where different taxpayers or different types of tax are concerned.133 On that 
note, the ECJ already refused to find a direct link between a subsidiary and its 
parent company, because those are distinct legal persons, each being subject to 
tax liability on its own, so that a direct link cannot be relied upon.134 Contrary 
to that, the ECJ accepted the cohesion justification in Krankenheim, where it 
found a direct link between a parent company and its permanent establish-
ment.135  
In the authors view, it is rather arduous to find a consistent thread in the previ-
ous discussed case law, which exacerbates the problem if the Court would 
eventually rely on the justification based on the coherence of the tax system. 
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D. Weber argues that a general deduction restriction may only be justified if the 
beneficiaries of such treatment reside in another Member State.136 In line with 
that reasoning, the Court held in Amurta, that a source state may levy taxes, in 
cases where a tax treaty provides for a tax credit in the resident state.137 
The cohesion justification relies on the assumption of fiscal territoriality and is 
also related to the justification based on the allocation of taxing rights.138 As 
regards fiscal territoriality, the ECJ appears yet to take a shift off the territoriali-
ty principle. In the Commission vs. Germany verdict, the Court held, that a na-
tional rule, according to which a tax deferral on capital gains is subject to the 
condition, that those capital gains are reinvested within the territory of Germa-
ny, violates EU law. According to the Court, a reinvestment in another country 
would also enhance and promote the undertaking and could guarantee the con-
tinuity of economic activity.139  
AG Kokott argues the justification based on the coherence of the tax system can 
be regarded as a manifestation of the single-tax principle140, which would also 
serve as an indication that the court would eventually accept coherence of the 
tax system as a valid justification with respect to linking rules in general.  
Having settled that, the finding of a justification on grounds of the coherence of 
the tax system or the allocation of taxation powers, depends essentially on 
whether the ECJ maintains or abolishes its reasoning on the territoriality princi-
ple. From the author’s perspective, the primary rule is arguably justified, if the 
ECJ discards the territorial nexus and takes account of the single tax principle. 
One must yet keep in mind, that a justification based on the allocation of taxing 
rights, may not serve as a standalone justification.141  
4.1.2.2 Need to Prevent Tax Avoidance 
Another justification may be seen in the need to prevent tax avoidance. In Cad-
bury, the Court explicitly required that restrictive measures might only be justi-
fied when the legislation at issue applies to wholly artificial arrangement, which 
do not reflect economic reality.142  
Tackling artificial arrangements is yet not a clear purpose of the primary rule at 
hand. Thus, prevention of tax avoidance may most likely not be found to justify 
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the restriction of the relevant freedom. However, there seem to be some indica-
tions, that the Court is not as strict on this requirement anymore. In Thin-Cap 
the ECJ stated, that a rule, which targets only partly artificial arrangements 
might also be justified.143 In any event, an artificial arrangement requires both 
subjective and objective elements.144 Against this background it is crucial to 
remember that hybrid mismatches and double non-taxation are in some cases 
intended by states to attract foreign investment. Situations like these make it 
hard to prove any link to artificial arrangements. Moreover, the Court appears 
to be somewhat reluctant to find abusive behaviour by a taxpayer. It is settled 
case law that pursuing a tax advantage in another Member State cannot itself 
deprive a person of the right to rely on Community Law, and benefitting from 
such treatment does not in itself constitute abuse.145 Based on these facts, it is 
rather unlikely, that the need to prevent tax avoidance will be an accepted justi-
fication by the ECJ. 
Another justification may be seen in the prevention of double use of losses, 
which was object of justification in the well-known Marks & Spencer case. 
Admittedly, while the scope of this justification is narrow, the ECJ will likely 
not consider it as a justification ground in case of linking rules.146 
Conclusively, the primary rule operates on the very edge of compliance with 
EU law. Although, there are grounds to believe that the primary rule may be 
justified based on the coherence of the tax system, it is hard to argue that this 
outcome is absolutely certain.  
As regards the proportionality test, the primary rule will arguably fail to be pro-
portionate when it causes an excessive administrative burden to the taxpayer. 
Apart from that, especially in the context of EU law, it is apparent that the 
BEPS recommendations do not take account of the constraints imposed by EU 
law, whatsoever.147 
4.2 Linking Rule in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive  
The concerns raised in connection with base erosion are by no means exclusive 
sorrows of the OECD. In fact, the EU, whereof numerous of their Member 
States are integral part of the OECD, did also recognize the emerging debate. 
Therefore the issue arises, on how the EU deals with hybrid mismatches and 
what its impacts are (if any) on the OECD and vice versa. Whereas one may 
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believe, that those are closely tied to one another, the subsequent elaboration 
will somewhat challenge this statement.  
While the main purpose of the PSD is to avoid double taxation of cross-border 
profit distributions between parent companies and their subsidiaries148, it has 
been exploited by several arrangements with the sole purpose to achieve double 
non-taxation, though.149 Before the recent amendments were taken into place, 
Member States had to grant tax exemption to their resident parent companies in 
respect of dividends received from their EU subsidiaries in any event. Yet, to 
make it ready for operation against base erosion, the Commission amended its 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which does now entail an anti-hybrid clause.150 At 
first glance, this appears to prove a reciprocal relationship between the OECD 
and the EU.151 The rule is aimed to prevent double non-taxation of dividends 
deriving from hybrid loan arrangements and shall prevent cross-border compa-
nies from planning their intra-group payments so as to result in double non-
taxation.152 The revised version of Article 4 (1) (a) reads as follows:  
The Member State of the parent company shall 
“Refrain from taxing such profits to the extent that such profits are not 
deductible by the subsidiary, and tax such profits to the extent that such 
profits are deductible by the subsidiary.”153  
Hence, the state of the parent company is basically forced to tax profits that 
were deductible in the state of the subsidiary, which leaves any tax incentives 
granted by the subsidiary state without effect. In fact, the rule causes a burden 
to the taxpayer, as he cannot benefit from intended tax exemptions anymore and 
is in so far treated worse than before. In the author´s view, this provision clearly 
interferes with the intended aim of the PSD, which is inter alia designed to en-
sure that the effective functioning of an internal market is not hampered by re-
strictions, distortions or disadvantages arising from tax provisions.154  
Moreover, there remain some loopholes, which allow the taxpayer to avoid ap-
plication of the linking rule. Since the scope of the PSD is limited to sharehold-
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ings of at least 10 %, the Directive has no effect on companies with a lower 
shareholding. Correspondingly, it may be conceiving that companies shift in-
vestments only to their minority shareholdings in order to avoid application of 
the linking rule. As a second concern, the scope of applicability is evidently 
limited to EU Member States. Thus, companies may likely structure their in-
vestments beyond EU borders to dodge taxation.155 Further, the PSD applies 
merely to “profit-distributions”, albeit there is no final definition of the term 
“profits” in the Directive. In that respect it is rather vague if hybrid payments 
may be considered as profits and would therefore be covered by the PSD.156 
However, in the authors opinion, a purposive interpretation of the rule will ar-
guably leave no doubt, that hybrid instruments are also covered by the scope of 
the term. Moreover, the PSD pursues the aim to avoid “asymmetrical” tax 
treatment157, which also supports the argument that hybrid payments fall in the 
scope of the Directive. On the same token the preamble of the amended Di-
rective states explicitly that the benefits of the Directive shall not lead to unin-
tended tax advantages such as double non-taxation.158 
Incidentally, the subject-to tax effect is limited to the scope of the PSD.159 
4.2.1 In Light of the OECD Proposals 
Unlike the primary rule of the OECD recommendations, the PSD allocates the 
taxing right to the Member State of the parent company (e.g. the resident state). 
Again, the primary rule allocates the taxing right to the source state, to the ex-
tent that an income leads to non-inclusion in the resident state. On that note, the 
proposed provision of the PSD is rather akin to the secondary rule160 of the 
OECD recommendations, which entitles the resident state to tax an item of in-
come to the extent, that the income has already been subject to a deduction in 
the source state. However, while both rules allocate the taxing right to the resi-
dent state, there remain major differences in terms of the scope of the legisla-
tion.  
Although E. Kokolia argues by implementing the OECD proposals EU Member 
States would not infringe EU law161, the author would abstain to jump to hasty 
conclusions. As already observed in the analysis of the German linking rule, 
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there are several solid objections to this legislation, which may likely violate 
EU law. 
Initially, the PSD does only apply to related companies with a shareholding of 
at least 10 % within the EU.162 Contrary, the OECD rules require a minimum 
shareholding of at least 25 %163, which narrows their scope. Thus, countries, 
which follow the OECD proposals, may likely infringe secondary EU law, 
since their provisions do not mitigate mismatches below 25 %, which is in clear 
conflict with the PSD.  
As demonstrated above, there are further differences as regards the scope of 
both rules. Moreover, the OECD recommendations do not obtain any legal val-
ue, unless adapted to domestic law, while a Directive is legally binding to EU 
Member States. Thirdly, in return to what was already discussed previously164, 
the defensive rule operates on the very edge to be considered as an obstacle to 
the fundamental freedoms. 
4.2.2 Impact on EU Law 
In response thereto, the question arises if this assumption might be different due 
to the fact that the EU itself now stipulates a similar provision in the PSD? One 
may argue that this is tantamount to a carte blanche, which feigns conformity 
with EU law of a measure that may otherwise be considered to violate EU law. 
This casts doubts on whether a directive can actually be contrary to primary EU 
law. 
Arguably, there is a general assumption that Community measures are “in prin-
ciple presumed to be lawful”.165 In the “Ouzo”-case, the Court stated that a Di-
rective remains in force unless it is withdrawn by the Council or declared inva-
lid by the ECJ.166 Also, In Gaz de France, the ECJ was asked whether a regula-
tion of the PSD may be contrary to one of the fundamental freedoms.167 In its 
ruling, the Court stated, that the  
“Community legislature has wide discretion in relation to the harmoni-
sation and approximation of legislation.”168 
This statement serves as an example, that the Court enjoys a broad margin, 
when it is asked to examine the validity of Community Law. In spite of that, 
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even if not related to tax law, the Court declared the Data Retention Directive 
invalid169 since it failed the proportionality test of the ECJ, which requires  
"that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legiti-
mate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the 
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those ob-
jectives."170 
Remarkably enough, even if declared invalid, the national laws transposing the 
directive in other countries will remain valid until challenged by domestic 
courts.171 Acknowledging, the issue at hand is not to declare an entire Directive 
as invalid, but rather to contest a certain provision of a directive, it does still 
demonstrate that the Court happens to strike down EU legislation under certain, 
although limited, circumstances. On the other hand, the threshold for the ECJ to 
strike down supranational legislation is reserved for quite extreme situations.172  
It is thus difficult to assess, whether the ECJ may eventually strike down the 
linking rule of the PSD. In the authors view, even if there are valid legal con-
cerns, this is rather unlikely since there are also political interests involved. 
Another strait of the proposed rule is linked to the administrative constraints it 
may cause, which is already discussed earlier in this thesis. Again, the linking 
rule requires the resident state of the parent company to possess certain 
knowledge of the tax treatment in another Member State to decide if the linking 
rule applies. Firstly, it is yet unclear, who will actually bear the burden of proof. 
Is it for the Member State of the parent company to provide evidence for non-
taxation in the source state or is it for the taxpayer? Secondly, how burdensome 
will the administrative work be to gather all the information required? At this 
place, one may keep in mind, that those administrative issues must not cause an 
excessive burden to the taxpayer.173 This argument may yet be less valuable 
when the mutual assistance directive provides for the necessary information, 
which may justify an additional administrative burden.174 Yet, the contrary is 
true if a third country is involved. Such a situation may still fall in the scope of 
free movement of capital, but the Mutual Assistance Directive would not be 
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applicable and arguably not serve as a possible justification based on an exces-
sive administrative burden.175 
Similarly, the linking rule may lead to contrary outcomes in respect to applica-
ble bilateral tax treaties concluded between Member States. Tax Treaties do not 
yet include any provisions comparable to a linking rule. Therefore, states, 
which apply their tax treaties, do arguably infringe secondary EU law, unless 
the national measure provides for a treaty override, such as the German provi-
sion. A treaty override, however, leads to different issues in domestic law, 
though. At least the OECD acknowledges developing a consistent amendment 
of its MC in foreseeable future.176 
Conclusively, in terms of its wording and purpose, the new linking rule of the 
PSD is comparable to the defensive rule. However there are major differences 
as regards their legal binding force and their scope. Since the defensive rule 
may cause an obstacle to EU law, the author would rather recommend Member 
States to implement the new rules of the Directive, since the latter is also legal-
ly binding and the risk of jeopardizing EU law is diminished, but yet not entire-
ly ruled out. 
In so far, while the rule itself supports the aim of avoiding double non-taxation, 
further adjustments are necessary in order to safeguard its desired purpose.  
Member States are called upon to implement the proposed legislation to domes-
tic law before the end of 2015. It remains to be seen if the linking rule of the 
PSD will be challenged in front of the ECJ. 
4.3 The Benchmark of Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
Hybrid Mismatches are at the core of international tax planning, aimed to 
achieve double non-taxation. Since numerous tax-planning activities operate on 
the very edge of legal validity, it will be assessed if mismatch arrangements 
may be counteracted by anti-avoidance legislation. One may yet keep in mind 
that double non-taxation is not only desirable for taxpayers to reduce their tax 
burden, but also an intended tool of several countries to attract foreign invest-
ment. In response to that, certain states, the EU and the OECD do increasingly 
rely on Anti-Avoidance legislations.177 
To have a brief view on the terminology in the field of tax evasion and tax 
avoidance, it is beyond any doubt, that tax evasion constitutes illegal con-
duct178, which is tantamount to abuse, whereas tax-avoidance operates in a legal 
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grey area.179 In general terms, tax planning is acceptable unless a certain 
threshold has been passed which would amount to abusive behaviour.180 Thus, 
hybrid mismatch arrangements are located in this very area and it appears, both 
the EU and the OECD are in an endeavour to ascertain a borderline between 
legal and unlawful mismatch arrangements, which they define as “aggressive 
tax planning”.181 The meaning of aggressive tax planning remains yet uncertain 
and does arguably not comply with well-established jurisprudence in this ar-
ea.182 
In fact, the European Council adopted a new anti-abuse rule in its PSD, which 
ensures that the benefits of the Directive are not granted to arrangements that 
are not “genuine”.183 The provision does not only apply to hybrid mismatches, 
but also to any other arrangement, which is not genuine. An arrangement shall 
be regarded as not genuine 
“to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial rea-
sons which reflect economic reality.”184 
It follows that this rule may be classified as a GAAR. 
In respect of GAARs it must however be said, that these are in all likelihood not 
capable of targeting hybrid mismatch situations. Hybrid mismatches are habitu-
ally in accordance with relevant domestic law and would thus not be in the 
scope of GAARs.185 Moreover, they are generally the corollary of sheer legal 
gaps, which result in different treatment of the same tax object. Legal gaps may 
hardly be hurdled by GAARs, as there is no immediate connection to abuse of 
law.186 Notably countries, which are not in the centre of economic world affairs, 
argue that anti-avoidance rules may also scare future investors away and hence 
reduce their income and in so far provide an opposite effect.187 
In the author’s view the new GAAR of the PSD will presumably not be capable 
to counter hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
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As regards the OECD proposals, there is a conceptual feature, which extents the 
scope of the linking rules not only to related parties, but also to so-called “struc-
tured arrangements”.188 Remarkably, the related-party requirement is abolished, 
when a structured arrangement is found to exist. Therefore any “structured ar-
rangement” falls in the scope of the linking rules, irrespectively of any owner-
ship test. The linking rule is specifically aimed to tackle deduction and no-
inclusion arrangements and may therefore be classified as a Specific Anti 
Avoidance Rule (SAAR). A “structured” arrangement is defined as 
“any arrangement where the hybrid mismatch is priced into the terms of 
the arrangement or the facts and circumstances (including the terms) of 
the arrangement indicate that it has been designed to produce a hybrid 
mismatch.”189 
Based on a literal interpretation, the use of the term “structured arrangement” is 
misplaced and confusing.190 What does it contribute to the internationally well-
accepted technical terms such as artificial arrangements, tax avoidance or genu-
ine arrangements, which is inherent in the PSD? Additionally, it is utterly un-
clear what is meant by “priced into the terms”. Furthermore, the threshold to be 
considered as a structured arrangement appears to be very low. This is con-
firmed by a non-exhaustive list of examples, according to which for instance an 
arrangement “that is designed, or is part of a plan, to create a hybrid mismatch, 
constitutes a structured arrangement”.191 The wording is cloudy and will likely 
lead to arbitrary conclusions. 
In the authors view, those are merely vague assumptions, which would lead to 
intense legal uncertainty in practice. According to constant law practice of the 
ECJ, a national anti-avoidance legislation causes a restriction to EU law, unless 
it is particular aimed to counter artificial arrangements.192 It follows, EU Mem-
ber States, who choose to implement this proposal, will certainly put EU law 
into jeopardy. It is utterly unclear, why the OECD did not rely on the interna-
tional accepted terms in this field.  
On a related note, the deliverable on Action 6 proposes to implement a GAAR 
in the OECD Model Convention. Notwithstanding the previous arguments, add-
ing a new rule to existing tax treaties bears always a risk, of an “a contrario” 
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interpretation, as Lang argues. The result of which would be to argue that those 
new features of the new GAAR were not existent in previous treaties.193  
Conclusively, neither the GAARs nor the linking rules are, at this juncture, ca-
pable to mitigate mismatch arrangements.  
4.4 Nexus between OECD and EU 
The previous work did already give ground to believe that there is a lack of 
comprehensive reciprocal relationship between the work of the OECD and the 
EU. In fact the OECD Report on Hybrid mismatches does not contain any ref-
erence whatsoever to EU law.194  
In spite of that, the Council of the European Union recalls explicitly  
“Its willingness to fight aggressive tax planning and base erosion and 
profit shifting at EU and international levels” and stresses that this 
work should consider the compatibility of on-going OECD work with 
the EU legal framework.195 
Therefore one is tempted to argue that the EU acts as a mere executive power, 
while the OECD is leading the way. In the authors view this statement is yet not 
beneficial from a EU perspective. One may likely interpret it in a way, accord-
ing to which the EU would transfer its juridical competence in this area to the 
OECD, which would be in clear conflict with the TFEU. Similarly the OECD 
itself is operating on the edge of their competence, when it brings in legislative 
proposals196. One may even argue the OECD is acting ultra vires. Therefore the 
EU is well advised to become aware of its duties, which are not to carry out 
orders blindly. This is especially true, when those orders are given by interna-
tional organisations without any juridical force. 
At least, the OECD did lately factor EU law in their deliverables regarding base 
erosion. In fact, the report about CFC-rules takes special account of the peculi-
arities of EU law.197 It acknowledges, that EU Member States may need to 
modify the recommendations to comply with EU law.198 However, while this 
statement comes rather late in terms of the BEPS project, one may question 
whether the OECD would be prepared to redraft their preceding deliverables by 
taking due care of EU law. 
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5 Alternative Remedies 
The previous assessment did demonstrate, that linking rules might from a theo-
retical perspective be capable to safeguard taxation of an item of income and 
hence mitigate double non-taxation. But it is also obvious that these rules entail 
a number of shortcomings. They must be highly sophisticated in order to be 
both effective and in compliance with domestic and EU law. To be thoroughly 
enforceable, the recommendations must be followed by all Member States, 
which may likely require several years.199 Along with that, from a global point 
of view it is truly necessary that non-member countries should also follow those 
recommendations in order to avoid exploitation of loopholes.200 It is however 
still an issue that the proclaimed shareholding varies between the OECD rec-
ommendations, domestic law systems and the EU proposals, which leads to 
uncertainty. The proposed Linking Rules do also cause a high administrative 
burden to all the Member States concerned, since they require an in depth un-
derstanding of foreign tax legislation. Surprisingly, the OECD did not by any 
means refer to this issue in their recommendations. However the published CFC 
deliverable devotes a special topic to the compliance with EU law and the issue 
of administrative burden.201 Some authors argue linking rules serve as a cau-
tionary tale on the intricacy of those rules.202 One of the arguments M. Lang 
makes, is that a rule, which is subject to the condition of a certain tax treatment 
in another country, may not serve the aim of creating a single market. Moreo-
ver, he favours a per-country approach, although admitting that there may arise 
some negative short-term effects, such as double non-taxation. Still, in the long 
run, it will provide sufficient remedy, due to the pressure, which arises on the 
legislator as a consequence of those negative effects.203 
Scholars do therefore discuss alternative means to mitigate base erosion and 
double non-taxation. 
Most likely, the cure-all remedy to counter all drawbacks of cross-border taxa-
tion will be a harmonized tax system.204 While the OECD does also briefly dis-
cuss this approach, it is basically forthwith abolished due to its high complexity, 
considering it not to be achievable at this point.205 On the same token, abolish-
ment of the debt-equity bias will arguably finally resolve the issue, since no 
qualification conflict can arise anymore.  
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As previously discussed, some authors view GAARs as a conceivable remedy. 
Again, the author does not share this opinion. A former German constitutional 
Court judge stated, that a good lawyer may not need an anti-abuse rule.206 
Therefore, the author will briefly focus on CFC rules as an example of Specific 
Anti Avoidance rules207 and State aid proceedings as a credible legal remedy.  
5.1 CFC Legislation 
It is argued that effective CFC regimes, enforced by the country of residence, 
may resolve the issue of double non-taxation, too.208 CFC rules are aimed at 
preventing deferral or denial of taxation by shifting profits to a CFC209 and thus 
limiting the deductibility of interest in certain offshore investment situations. 
While the scope of CFC rules compared to the alleged linking rules is limited to 
interest expenses, hybrid mismatches do in the vast majority of cases only occur 
in the context of interest payments.210 It follows that CFC rules may also be 
auspicious in the fight against base erosion, since they protect the tax base of 
the residence country. There are also positive “spill-over” effects on source 
countries, as taxpayers have no incentive to invest in low-tax jurisdiction, any-
more.211 
The main drawbacks of CFC rules are yet, that countries apply broad excep-
tions to their CFC regimes, which makes their circumvention quite accessible 
for MNEs. This is especially true for the US CFC regime, which is incapable of 
taxing the profits of enterprises like Apple, Starbucks and others due to the 
granted exceptions.212 Therefore, CFC rules are on the agenda of Action 3 of 
the OECD, which is aimed at strengthening CFC legislation.213 
Another drawback is, that CFC rules may also cover genuine transactions, 
which is why their scope in a EU context must be limited to wholly artificial 
arrangements, as confirmed by the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppes.214 
Thus, if carefully drafted, CFC rules may serve as a useful remedy against base 
erosion, too. Even if not subject to deeper investigation, CFC rules as compared 
to linking rules, are easier to administer, not least because they are already 
widely accepted.  
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As mentioned previously the OECD proposals as regards CFC rules are argua-
bly better drafted, since it appears that the OECD takes due care of the con-
straints, which EU law may impose on CFC rules.  
5.2 State Aid 
While all the measures proposed up to this point are predominantly aimed at 
restricting inadmissible conduct of the taxpayer, one may again evoke that dou-
ble non taxation and double deductions are not merely the result of tax planning 
activities but also intended tools by certain states. As follows, it is inappropriate 
to blame only taxpayers for the alleged loss of tax revenue. State Aid 
measures215 serve therefore as appropriate means to investigate on states if of-
fered tax incentives lead to harmful tax competition. In 2014 , the Commission 
started several state aid proceedings against measures, which favour tax arbi-
trage of MNEs. According to the Commission MNEs were excessively or un-
fairly reducing their global tax burden by taking advantage of intentionally 
granted tax incentives.216 Especially internationally accepted principles, such as 
the single tax-principle serve as a tool to check a domestic tax system against its 
own principles.217 One of the benefits in favour of state aid proceedings is, that 
those can not only be applied against a tax scheme in general, but also and more 
important against certain individual tax rulings, since those demonstrate how 
the law is enforced and that possible discretionary treatment leads to an as-
sumption of state aid.218 Noteworthy, state aid decisions bear a retrospective 
effect, which means, that the Commission will order the recovery of any grant-
ed tax benefit and interest thereof.219 
Albeit not subject to deeper investigation, State Aid measures would likely be 
capable to counter the negative outcomes of harmful tax competition, too. 
6 Final Remarks 
This inquiry assessed linking rules against various legal benchmarks and exam-
ined their legal compliance and capability. 
Based on the previous analysis, the primary and the secondary rule entail nu-
merous risks to infringe EU law. This is especially true in respect of the sec-
ondary rule as incorporated into German Law, since it does not achieve its in-
tended aim as prescribed by the German legislator. It follows that uniform inte-
gration of the proposed measures arguably exacerbates the situation even more, 
since domestic legal systems make those rules subject to various other condi-
tions of their national legal frameworks. Furthermore, Member States are at 
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liberty to amend those rules at their discretion, which would likely cause further 
disorder. Consequently, one of the greatest weaknesses of the OECD recom-
mendations is nonetheless the lack of legal value and enforceability. 
For those reasons, the author argues that organisations without juridical power, 
act ultra vires and should restrain from proposing legal measures such as link-
ing rules. 
To this end, the new linking rule as incorporated in the PSD is legally binding 
to EU Member States, which makes it also uniformly enforceable. Although 
equipped with legal force, this provision does still not resolve the issue as re-
gards compliance with EU law. Similar to the observations made in respect of 
the secondary rule, there remain grounds to believe that this provision is threat-
ening conformity with primary EU law. 
While the author confesses that linking rules may – theoretically – be capable to 
mitigate double non-taxation, since they take account of the single tax principle, 
there are various drawbacks, which eventually render them infeasible. Estab-
lishing a new law does only make sense if their benefits outweigh their draw-
backs, though. 220  
In particular the work on “Aggressive Tax Planning” is ill defined and contains 
a number of terms, which are ambiguous and hard to align to already estab-
lished concepts in this area. 
Instead, alternative countermeasures, such as State Aid proceedings and CFC 
rules appear auspicious to mitigate double non-taxation and do not suffer from 
comparable dilemmas. Clearly, CFC and State Aid measures are already well 
established in international and European legal practice and require only minor 
adjustments to be immediately enforceable. 
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